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ABSTRACT
This paper describes a student project examining mechanisms with which to
attack Bluetooth-enabled devices. The paper briefly describes the protocol
architecture of Bluetooth and the Java interface that programmers can use to
connect to Bluetooth communication services. Several types of attacks are
described, along with a detailed example of two attack tools, Bloover II and BT
Info.
Keywords: Bluetooth hacking, mobile phone hacking, wireless hacking
1. INTRODUCTION
Bluetooth (BT) is one of the newer wireless technologies in use today. The
name derives from that of Harald Blaatand, a tenth-century king of Denmark
and Norway who united many independent Scandinavian tribes into a single
kingdom. Bluetooth wireless communication technology is meant to be a
universal, standard communications protocol for short-range communications,
intended to replace the cables connecting portable and fixed electronic devices
(Bluetooth SIG, 2008a). Operating in the 2.4 GHz range, Bluetooth is designed
to allow wire-free communication over a range of short-haul distances in three
power classes, namely, short range (10-100 cm), ordinary range (10 m), and
long range (100 m) (Sridhar, 2008). Cell phones, personal digital assistants
(PDAs), and smart phones are a few of the devices that commonly use
Bluetooth for synchronizing email, sending messages, or connecting to a
remote headset (Mahmoud, 2003a). What are less well known to users of
Bluetooth devices are the risks that they incur due to various vulnerabilities of
the technology. Bluehacking, bluejacking, marphing, bluesniping, and
bluesnafting are just a few of the names given to the act of hacking a device via
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Bluetooth (Laurie, Holtmann, & Herfurt, 2006). In this paper, we will discuss
the technology needed to hack a cell phone, some of the tools, and precautions
that users can take to help protect their Bluetooth devices.
2. TECHNOLOGY
Figure 1 shows a diagram of the Bluetooth protocol stack in order to show the
various attack vectors. The protocol layers of particular interest in this paper
are:
•

Logical Link Control and Adaptation Protocol (L2CAP): Provides the
data interface between higher layer data protocols and applications,
and the lower layers of the device; multiplexes multiple data streams;
and adapts between different packet sizes (Hole, 2008a, 2008d;
Sridhar, 2008).

•

Radio Frequency Communications Protocol (RFCOMM): Emulates
the functions of a serial communications interface (e.g., EIA-RS-232)
on a computer. As Figure 1 shows, RFCOMM can be accessed by a
variety of higher layer schemes, including AT commands, the Wireless
Application Protocol (WAP) over the Transmission Control
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) stack, or the Object Exchange
(OBEX) protocol (Hole, 2008a, 2008e; Sridhar, 2008).

•

Object Exchange protocol: A vendor-independent protocol allowing
devices to exchange standard file objects, such as data files, business
cards (e.g., vCard files), and calendar information (e.g., vCal files).
OBEX is a higher layer application and runs over different operating
systems (e.g., PalmOS and Windows CE) and different
communications protocols (e.g., Bluetooth and IrDA) (Gusev, n.d.).

Most of the tools that are being used to hack Bluetooth phones use the Java
programming language. In order for the software to work, the phone that is
used to initiate the attack needs to support JSR-82, which is the official Java
Bluetooth Application Programming Interface (API) (JCP, 2009). If the
attacker’s phone does not support JSR-82, that phone cannot be used to attack
other phones. This is an important note because although Bluetooth is widely
available on cell phones, Java and JSR-82 support may not be.
JSR-82 consists of two packages, namely, javax.bluetooth, which is the core
Bluetooth API, and javax.obex, which is independent of the Bluetooth stack
and provides APIs to other protocols, such as OBEX. The capabilities of JSR82 include the ability to (Hole, 2007; Mahmoud, 2003b):
•

Register services

•

Discover devices and services
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•

Establish L2CAP, RFCOMM, and OBEX connections between
devices, using those connections to send and receive data (voice
communication is not supported)

•

Manage and control the communication connections

•

Provide security for these activities

Hole (2008a, 2008f) and Mahmoud (2003b) provide good overviews of how
this code functions.

Figure 1: Bluetooth protocol stack (Source: Tutorial-Reports.com, n.d.)

3. BLUETOOTH SECURITY
Bluetooth defines three security modes. Security Mode 1 provides no security
enforcement, meaning that the device is effectively taking no steps to protect
itself. Security Mode 2 enforces security at the service level. In this mode, a
particular application might be relatively safe but no additional device
protection has been added. Security Mode 3 is the highest level of security,
employing link level enforced security mechanisms. Security Mode 3 protects
the device from certain intrusions and, therefore, all services and applications
(Bluetooth SIG, 2008b; Hole, 2008b; Laurie et al., 2006).
All Bluetooth services have a default set level of security. Within the service
level security, there are also three levels of security. Some services that require
authorization and authentication in order to be used, some require
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authentication only, and some are open to all devices (Bluetooth SIG, 2008b).
Bluetooth devices themselves have two levels of security when describing
other devices, namely trusted devices and untrusted devices.
4. TYPES OF ATTACKS
There are a variety of attacks that can be employed against Bluetooth devices,
many with colorful names such as bluebugging, bluebumping, bluedumping,
bluejacking, bluesmacking, bluesnarfing, bluespooofing [sic], bluestabbing,
bluetoothing, and car whisperer. All take advantage of weaknesses in
Bluetooth that allow an attacker unauthorized access to a victim's phone. It is
imperative to note that while Bluetooth is commonly associated with networks
limited in scope to 100 m, attacks on Bluetooth devices have been documented
at ranges in excess of 1,500 m. using Bluetooone [sic] (Laurie, 2006).
One common approach to hacking Bluetooth devices is to employ malformed
objects, which are legal files exchanged between BT devices that contain
invalid information, thus causing unexpected results. When a Bluetooth device
receives a malformed object, such as a vCard or vCal file, the device may
become unstable or fail completely. Alternatively, an attacker might also use a
vCard or vCal file to inject commands allowing the attacker to take control of
the device. This kind of an attack can be very harmful to a phone (E-Stealth,
2008; Laurie et al., 2006).
Some of the common attacks on Bluetooth devices include:
•

Bluebugging: An extraordinarily powerful attack mechanism,
bluebugging allows an attacker to take control of a victim's phone
using the AT command parser. Bluebug allows an attacker to access a
victim's phone in order to make phone calls, send short message
service (SMS) messages, read SMS messages stored on the phone,
read and write contact list entries, alter phone service parameters,
connect to the Internet, set call forwarding, and more (Bluebugging,
n.d.; Laurie et al., 2006).

•

Bluejacking: The sending of unsolicited messages to open Bluetooth
devices by sending a vCard with a message in the name field and
exploiting the OBEX protocol (Bluejacking, 2009).

•

Bluesmack: A Bluetooth analog of the Ping-of-Death denial-of-service
attack. This is a buffer overflow attack using L2CAP echo messages
(Bluesmack, n.d.; Laurie, 2006).
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•

Bluesnarf and Bluesnarf++: Attacks allowing for the theft of
information from a Bluetooth device using the OBEX Push Profile.
The attacker needs only find a phone that has Bluetooth in
discoverable mode. Bluesnarf works by a connection to most of the
Object Push Profile services and the attacker retrieves the file names of
known files from the Infrared Mobile Communications (IrMC) list
instead of sending vCard information as expected. With these attacks
the hacker can retrieve items such as the phonebook, calendar, and
other personal information. With Bluesnarf++, the attacker has full
read and write access to the file system of the phone. When an attacker
is connected via the OBEX Push Profile, he/she has full access to the
victim's phone without having to pair the two devices. The biggest risk
with this function is that an attacker can delete crucial file system files,
rendering the victim's device useless. In addition, the attacker can
access any memory cards that are attached to the device (BlueSnarf,
n.d.; Bluesnarfing, n.d.; Laurie et al., 2006).

•

Helomoto: Helomoto is functionally similar to the Bluebug attack but
takes advantage of poor implementations of "trusted device" handling
on some phones. As in bluebug attacks, the attacker pretends to send a
vCard to an unauthenticated OBEX Push Profile on the victim's phone.
Once started, the attacker interrupts the transfer process and the victim
then lists the attacker’s phone as a trusted device. The attacker can then
connect to the victim's phone and take control of the device by issuing
AT commands. This attack is so-named because it was first discovered
on Motorola phones (Helomoto, n.d.; Laurie et al., 2006).

These attacks are only a few that can be launched against Bluetooth interfaces
in phones, laptops, and even automobiles. E-Stealth (2008) and Laurie et al.
(2006) offer information about a wide range of attacks that can be launched via
Bluetooth vulnerabilities.
5. TOOLS FOR ATTACK
There are many options that a user can choose from when looking to attack a
Bluetooth phone. Web sites such as E-Stealth (http://www.e-stealth.com/) and
FlexiSPY (http://www.flexispy.com/) offer commercial products to allow one
party to eavesdrop or attack another party's Bluetooth device, ostensibly to trap
an unfaithful spouse, catch an unscrupulous employee, or monitor a teenage
child. These are merely commercial versions of hacker tools that include
Bloover, Bloover II, BT Info, BT_File_Explorer, ISeeYourFiles, MiyuX, and
STMBlueS (D3scene, 2008; E-Stealth, 2008; Getjar, 2008; Laurie et al., 2006;
SE-NSE, 2006). Many of these programs (like so many hacker tools such as
Back Orifice and SubSeven), are distributed as "management tools" but what
differentiates them from bona fide management tools is that the managed party
may not be aware that the program is running. And, like any "management"
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tool, these programs are often platform-dependent so that they work best on
certain brands of devices and may not work on all devices; MiyuX, for
example, works best on Sony Ericsson phones. A nice collection of all of these
tools
in
one
package
can
be
found
at
tradebit
(http://www.tradebit.com/filedetail.php/5006527-basic-bluetooth-spysoftware).
5.1 Testing the Software
The first author experimented with the feasibility of actually using this
software in a real environment, employing Bloover II (which allows an
attacker to obtain information from a victim's phone) and BT Info (which
allows an attacker to control the victim’s phone). Both were part of the
Ultimate Bluetooth Mobile Phone Spy Software New Edition 2008 available
from E-Stealth (http://www.e-stealth.com/).
It is worth noting that this software claims to be useable on any Bluetooth
phone to hack any other Bluetooth phone but, like so many software claims,
this one was overstated. Initial attempts to use the software on a Sanyo SCP7050 failed because the software could not be installed. Later, the first author
purchased a BlackBerry Curve. Although the software user guide provided
instructions on how to install the software on a BlackBerry, the install failed
when an error stated that the phone did not support the correct Java API.
The phones that were used successfully for testing throughout this project were
United Kingdom versions of a Sony Ericsson W550i and a W800i. Theses
phone both support JSR-82 enabling them to run the software. In order to
actually use the phones, a Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) card was needed
for each phone. The SIM card does not actually need to be active if the attacker
is only going to be probing and manipulating the target phone and not making
calls. Throughout the testing for this project both phones used inactive SIM
cards.
5.2 Bloover II
Bloover (also known as Blooover), standing for Bluetooth Wireless
Technology Hoover, is a proof-of-concept application. Bloover II is a secondgeneration version of a program that consists of several different types of
attacks, including Bluebug, Bluesnarf, Helomoto, and the use of malformed
objects. Breeder is a related program that propagates Bloover II clients (Laurie
et al., 2006).
The attack software package that was purchased included a program called
Bloover II. Once a JSR-82 enabled phone was found, the program installed
easily. As for running the program, it seemed to always halt on one of the
processes. One of the processes that the software kept halting on was when the
program was running the “HeloMoto” attack. During this attack, the hacking
phone tries to “plant” an entry into the victim’s phonebook. Within the options
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of the Bloover II program, the hacker can chose which attacks they would like
to use on the victim’s phone. When going through and trying each attack by
itself, the software would always halt on some process. The only operation that
could be conducted was the initial audit of the phone to get basic information
about the phone.
Figure 2 shows a series of screen shots using Bloover II from a W550i phone
to access a W800i phone. Figure 2a shows the attacker's phone scanning for
another Bluetooth phone; in Figure 2b, a device named W800i is found. The
audit feature of Bloover is initiated (Figure 2c) and results (Figure 2d) include
the target device's address, communications channel for communication with
the headset and other functional profiles, the RFCOMM channel, and phone
contact information. A specific attack type (Bluebug in this case) is selected
from the Quick Config menu (Figure 2d).

2a)

2b)

2d)

2c)

2e)

Figure 2. Bloover II screen shots.
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5.3 BT Info
Because of increased functionality, a larger amount of time was spent using a
program called BT Info. With this program, the attacker can completely control
the target device if the attacker can become paired with the target. Once the
Bluetooth pairing takes places, the attacker can perform a broad set of
functions on the target phone, ranging from placing a phone call or sending an
SMS message to turning the phone off or performing a master reset. The
hardest part for the attacker, in fact, is finding a device with an open Bluetooth
connection or tricking someone into pairing his or her phone.

3a)

3b)

3c)

3d)

Figure 3. BT Info screen shots (device pairing).
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Figure 3 shows a series of screen shots of an attacker's phone (W550i) pairing
up with a target phone (W800i). Once pairing has been successfully
accomplished, BT Info displays a menu of possible actions (Figure 4a). The
Informations screen (Figure 4b) allows the attacker to retrieve basic
information about the target phone, such as the phone manufacturer and model,
firmware version, battery level, signal level, International Mobile Equipment
Identity (IMEI), and International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI).
The Ringing screen (Figure 4c) allows the attacker to control the ringing on the
target phone. This option allows the attacker to force the target phone to start
ringing and not stop until the target phone is turned off or the attacker issues
the Stop command. Within the Ringing option, the attacker is able to select the
type of ringtone to start.

4a)

4b)

4c)

4d)

Figure 4. BT Info screen shots (initial menu functions).
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The Calling menu (Figure 4d) offers four options, allowing the attacker to dial
any number, hang up a call, place a current call on hold, or redial the last
number. An attacker can use the Calling option, for example, to call a second
phone owned by the attacker in order to listen in on the victim's conversations.
If the target phone has a speaker function that operates when the phone is
closed, the attacker can still be able to establish a call and listen in. From the
main Actions menu, the attacker can also change the display language that the
phone uses.

5a)

5b)

5c)

5d)

Figure 5. BT Info screen shots (Keys functions).

The Keys function (Figure 5a) is a feature of BT Info that allows an attacker to
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watch the keys that the victim pushes as they are being pushed or allows an
attacker to remotely press keys on the victim's phone. For the latter function,
the attacker can access the target phone's "joystick" keys (Figure 5b) or
individual keypad keys (Figure 5c). The control function of BT Info (Figure
5d) allows the attacker to remotely access the target's control keys, including
volume control, media player, and camera.
BT Info also gives an attacker access to the target phone's text messages. The
SMS action (Figure 6a), for example, allows the attacker to select a mailbox on
the victim's phone and retrieve the complete contents of all SMS messages.
Some of the other actions are simply informational, including the temperature
of the phone, what Bluetooth devices are trusted on the victim’s phone, what
sound, if any, the phone makes when a button is pressed, the memory status,
and what action forces a keylock.
The Operations action (Figure 6b) has several options. Automatic Keylock
gives an attacker the ability to automatically lock the victim's when it is
unlocked; i.e., when the victim unlocks the phone, it will automatically relock
itself. The Random Time and Date Change option randomly changes the date
and time on the victim's roughly a hundred times per minute. Similarly, the
Random Alarm option randomly sets the victim phone's alarm settings.

6a)

6b)

6c)

Figure 6. BT Info screen shots (miscellaneous).

The Custom Command function (Figure 6c) allows an attacker to power down
or force a master reset on a victim's phone. This function can also be used to
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execute whatever AT commands are available on the target phone. BT Info
also has a Phonebook function that allows an attacker to read the victim’s
phonebook and recent call history.
BT Info was tested using several different Bluetooth phones and was employed
most successfully between the two Sony Ericsson phones mentioned above.
The first author was able to use one of the Sony Ericsson phones to connect
with a Motorola Razr, although the functionality of BT Info was somewhat
limited, only allowing call initiation and access to SMS messages.
Functionality of BT Info will vary by the model of both attacker and target
phone (E-Stealth, 2008).
A video of the first author using BT Info between the two Sony Ericsson
phones can be found at http://c3di.champlain.edu/TR/BTInfo_Browning.m4v
(11 minutes, 350 MB).
6. PRECAUTIONS
As with so many aspects of security, user awareness and vigilance is the best
defense against the kinds of attacks described here. The best way to protect a
device, obviously, is to simply turn Bluetooth off. A device cannot be hacked
via a Bluetooth attack vector if other Bluetooth devices cannot see it. Some
devices come with Bluetooth turned on by default so users need to check this
setting.
If Bluetooth must be enabled, the user can set the device to be hidden
(analogous to not broadcasting the network name on a wireless network).
Setting a device to be invisible will still allow Bluetooth communications to
function but will only allow connections to trusted devices that have been
previously configured. This protection is not perfect, however; if an attacker
finds out that a particular device is trusted, they can use their own Bluetooth
device to masquerade as the trusted device and will then be able to connect to
the target phone (this is a common spoofing attack).
If a user must use Bluetooth, they should also only turn it on as needed. In
addition, users should change their Bluetooth personal identification number
(PIN) every month or so. Changing the PIN requires that any Bluetooth devices
that the user regularly employs will need to be re-paired, but it also makes it a
bit harder for attackers. Attacks succeed because many users will balk at
constantly turning their Bluetooth port on and off, or changing the PIN, but at
the very least users should change the default PIN when they first get their
Bluetooth enabled device (Jansen & Scarfone, 2008).
7. CONCLUSION
The intent of this project was to determine how real the threat is of attacks to
Bluetooth-enabled devices and how easy such attacks are to launch. After
spending a relatively short amount of time and a few dollars, it is clear how
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vulnerable Bluetooth technology really is. The idea that someone could listen
to all conversations a victim is having without them even knowing, or have
their text messages read, are key examples of the dangers of Bluetooth. Even
worse, an attacker can initiate a call to someone or text someone without the
victim ever knowing. The only way a user would be able to catch this activity
is if they were to look through their call log or look at the sent messages on
their phone. Even that might be insufficient, as the attacker can delete the
records of their nefarious activity and the victim would never know until their
bill comes out. The victim would only know about unusual behavior if they
carefully look at their bill, which is increasingly problematic since many
people do not even look at their detailed call records. And even if someone
complains that they "did not make a call on this date and time," the mobile
service carrier has proof that the call was made from this device because,
indeed, it was.
Users need to be made aware of the vulnerabilities of these devices so that they
can employ them more effectively, safely, and confidently.
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